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 Author Solomzi Tshona says the meeting of Chinese president Xi Jingping, Russian president Vladimir Putin and US president Donald Trump in Shenzhen should be judged by whether it serves the wider international community, not only the three powers in the room. Picture: SUPPLIED
Author Solomzi Tshona says the meeting of Chinese president Xi Jingping, Russian president Vladimir Putin and US president Donald Trump in Shenzhen should be judged by whether it serves the wider international community, not only the three powers in the room. Picture: SUPPLIED

INSIGHT | Nuclear risks, trade stability and Gulf security top agenda as world powers meet

On Thursday in Shenzhen, President Xi Jinping will welcome Russian president Vladimir Putin and US president Donald Trump to the first face-to-face meeting of the three leaders.

That the meeting will take place in China, and in Shenzhen of all cities, is itself a statement.

A fishing town four decades ago, Shenzhen became the symbol of reform.

It now hosts a conversation about the future of global security and the world economy.

The facts are already clear. China's foreign ministry has described the meeting as one of groundbreaking significance.

Washington says the talks will cover the reduction of nuclear arsenals and the war involving Iran, while Ukraine will not be on the agenda.

The question, then, is not whether three leaders will sign a grand bargain in a single afternoon.

It is what this first encounter is likely to set in motion, and what role China will play in shaping it.

China arrives as the convenor and the fastest-growing economy of the three.

But economic weight is only part of the story.

Over the past decade China has offered the world a coherent set of public goods with Chinese characteristics — the Belt and Road Initiative, followed by the Global Development Initiative in 2021, the Global Security Initiative in 2022, the Global Civilisation Initiative in 2023 and the Global Governance Initiative in September 2025.

Together they reflect a civilisational outlook that values harmony over confrontation, dialogue over coercion, and development as the foundation of security.

Shenzhen will test that outlook in practice. Bringing Moscow and Washington to the same table is exactly the kind of consultation the Global Security Initiative calls for.

Based on what the three governments have said publicly, five outcomes appear most likely.

First, dialogue on nuclear risk, not a treaty.

New START, the last agreement limiting US and Russian strategic forces, expired on February 5.

US assessments put the American and Russian stockpiles at more than 5,000 warheads each, against China's more than 600.

Beijing has consistently held that the two largest nuclear powers bear primary responsibility for disarmament.

I expect China to restate that principle while supporting practical steps to reduce the risk of miscalculation.

Second, a path to stabilise US-China trade.

The decisive economic conversation will be Xi's separate meeting with Trump. The two sides extended their trade truce in September to January 10 2027.

Rare-earth supplies and agricultural purchases are likely to anchor efforts to extend that arrangement.

A predictable China-US relationship is the single most important stabiliser for the world economy.

Third, a shared call for de-escalation in the Gulf.

Before the war, the Strait of Hormuz carried about a fifth of the world's oil supply. In October alone, 37 ships were attacked in and around the strait.

China has every reason to press for safe navigation.

Even a joint signal of restraint could ease the risk premium in oil markets.

Fourth, no trilateral outcome on Ukraine.

Beijing has made clear that European countries must be involved in any discussion of the conflict.

That position respects the principle that those most affected must have a voice.

Fifth, and most important, a precedent.

The lasting result of Shenzhen is likely to be the format itself — a channel through which the three largest nuclear powers can consult, with China as convenor rather than a bystander to arrangements made elsewhere.

Some commentators have compared Shenzhen with Yalta in 1945, when three leaders divided the post-war world.

The comparison misreads both the moment and China's philosophy.

Nothing on the published agenda concerns territory or spheres of influence. The world of 2026 is bound together by supply chains, digital networks and dozens of influential states.

China's Global Governance Initiative explicitly calls for sovereign equality and a greater voice for developing countries.

Shenzhen should, therefore, be judged by whether it serves the wider international community, not only the three powers in the room.

For Africa, the meeting matters through three channels.

The first is energy. For oil-importing African economies, a calmer Gulf would mean lower transport costs, easier inflation and less pressure on currencies.

The second is minerals. The rare-earth question raises the strategic value of reserves in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Zimbabwe, SA, Mozambique and Namibia.

African governments should use this moment to insist on local processing and beneficiation rather than raw exports.

The third channel is shipping. Disruption in the Gulf has diverted traffic around the Cape of Good Hope, placing Southern African ports on a busier global map.

For SA, the opportunity is to modernise its ports and rail and attract investment that builds local industry and employs young people.

Here the China–Africa partnership has a particular role.

The Global Development Initiative's focus on industrialisation, infrastructure and poverty reduction aligns closely with the continent's priorities.

The task ahead is to make sure that partnership deepens Africa's productive capacity, not only its trade.

The success of Shenzhen will not be measured by photographs.

It will be measured by whether the three powers establish a channel to manage nuclear risk, whether China-US trade remains predictable beyond January, whether shipping through Hormuz becomes safer, and whether the rest of the world, particularly the Global South, sees its interests reflected in what follows.

China's civilisation has long taught that lasting order rests on harmony among differences.

If Shenzhen produces even a modest framework for dialogue among the world's three largest nuclear powers, it will show that this ancient idea still has something to offer a divided world.

Solomzi Tshona is a PhD candidate in development economics at the Global School of Leadership, Renmin University of China. The views expressed are his own.